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Autonomic network environments are required to be 
resilient. Resilience is defined as the ability for a network to 
provide and maintain an acceptable level of service in the 
face of various challenges to normal operation [1]. Traffic 
abnormalities are a great challenge and it is vital for any 
network to be supported by resilient mechanisms in order to 
detect and mitigate such events. In this document we 
present our measurement-based resilience architecture and 
we argue that the correct combination of already proposed 
theoretical methodologies and mechanisms present in our 
architecture compose a powerful defence mechanism that 
satisfies autonomic properties such as self-protection and 
self-optimization. In addition we refer to our intentions of 
testing our proposed architecture within the ANA project 
[2] in order to justify our hypothesis.   
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1.INTRODUCTION
Future networks will be required to autonomously 
configure, organise and adapt their operation at the onset of 
challenges in their environment, and consequently to 
confront explicit threats coming from external stimuli. 
These and several other self-* capabilities are in the list of 
the main objectives within the EU Autonomic Network 
Architecture (ANA) project that intends to build a novel 
architecture demonstrating the principles of autonomic 
networking. The primary aim within ANA is to enable the 
use of networks beyond the Internet legacy, and to facilitate 
a dynamic and transparent interaction among the wide range 
heterogeneous networks and platforms.
Our resilience architecture considers the properties of self-
protection and self-optimization and achieves their 
applicability with the usage of combined mechanisms that 
are already present in past literature.  In parallel our 
“pluggable” design enables modular decomposition and 
distributed dynamic binding no matter the physical location 
of our components. This capability allows detection and 
mitigation of an anomaly not only on a local but as well on 
a compartment-wide scenario. Within ANA a compartment 
refers to the most absolute network entity, which is 
autonomous and implements all the operational and 
administrative rules for a given communication context.     
2.RESILIENCE ARCHITECTURE
The resilience architecture adopts a componentised design 
that requires information from a monitoring facility. As 
showed in Figure 1, a monitoring entity sends information 
of monitored packets to the Detection Engine (DE) of the 
system where those are received on the designated interface 
that we refer to as the Information Dispatch Point (IDP). 
After processing packet data and grouping flows at a 
desired level of granularity, the DE internally performs 
entropy estimation on selected packet features in order to 
detect an anomaly and applies runtime classification via a 
supervised Naive Bayes estimator. By these actions the DE 
is eligible to decide whether the observed flows are the 
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result of a local or compartment-wide anomaly. As soon as 
a concrete decision regarding the precise nature of the 
anomaly is denoted the DE composes a summary 
specification message that sends to its closest Remediation 
Engine (RE). In the case of a compartment-wide threat the 
RE distributes the threat information to regionally close 
REs. These subsequently decide at which compartment 
region they should take action for facing the event (e.g 
perform load balancing on a congested area with multiple 
links).
Figure 1: The overall resilient architecture
2.1The Detection Engine
The DE as shown in Figure 2 is composed by the Logic Brick, the 
Classifier, the Notifier brick and a configuration manager.
Figure 2: The DE internal architecture
The Predictor unit in the Logic Brick acts according to the 
estimates given by the distribution of selected packet 
features (e.g. checksum field) and applies entropy 
estimation in order to get an understanding for the evolution 
of the selected fields in each received flow. Entropy 
estimation provides a detailed and more accurate 
identification of events that may not be extracted in large 
traffic volumes [3]. In parallel with the operations made in 
the Predictor, the Learner unit performs run-time traffic 
classification, based on the sample entropy results given by 
the Predictor and the already categorized past events stored 
in the Classifier. The Learner unit uses a supervised naive 
Bayes estimator where as a probabilistic classifier accepts a 
range of training data and classify certain events while on 
runtime. We have selected this classification method 
because it has been observed by [4] that such a method has 
low processing cost and high accuracy percentage. Finally 
the internal architecture also has a Notifier unit which is in 
charge of updating the REs in case of a local or 
compartment-wide attack diagnosis.  
2.2 The Remediation Engine
Figure 3 shows the RE which is the component in charge of 
mitigating the effects of an anomaly (e.g. high system load, 
increased bandwidth consumption, congestion, etc.) 
Remediation algorithms that we consider are region-aware 
clustering algorithms for facing a local or compartment-
wide event (e.g. a Flash Crowd or DDoS) by performing 
load balancing techniques on the desired regions. The 
actions performed by region-aware algorithms empower the 
property of self-optimization.  In parallel due to the cluster 
and location awareness that an RE performs it also 
possesses the capability of dynamically binding to its intra-
compartment closest DE (no matter its actual physical 
location) where that provides a flexible and autonomic 
character to the architecture in general. The RE is 
composed by two main functional modules; the Defender 
and the Messenger. The Defender executes the remediation 
algorithms whereas the Messenger distributes the instance 
of an event to remote REs within the compartment which 
are also affected by the threat. 
Figure 3: The RE internal architecture
3.CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
The proposed design of the resilience architecture satisfies 
core autonomic properties such as self-protection and self-
optimization. Using a combination of detection and 
classification algorithms for abnormal network behaviour, 
we will demonstrate the applicability and efficiency of a 
run-time network resilience system. Our main objective is 
to integrate the resilience architecture with the rest of the 
ANA software in order to perform experimentation on both 
intra and inter-compartment scenarios.
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